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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
REGIONS 
Back to the future 
Sergei Sobyanin, the Russian Federation president's first deputy plenipotentiary 
representative in the Urals Federal District, has proposed the consolidation of 
Russia's current regions. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0111, via World News Connection) 
 
Pointing out that the territorial divisions, imposed by Stalin's national policy, are 
thus of relatively recent origin, he stresses their inefficiency in a democratic state. 
He suggests a gradual merging: first, by introducing an integrated legal system, 
then a "joint social sphere," and finally a coordinated policy, with an eye to "a 
scientifically justified territorial balance of the population's needs." A "common 
strategic planning center" would be established "to ensure objectivity," and, 
naturally, regional envy and arrogance would be abolished. In the meantime, 
coordinated financial, economic and infrastructure changes that would be 
desirable and achievable would be set into motion. (Mr. Sobyanin suggests, for 
example, such changes in the Tyumen Oblast's relations between the rich, 
industrial, but climatically inhospitable north, and the pleasanter, but poorer 
south.) 
 
"Sobyanin's logic is simple," Rossiyskaya gazeta claims. "He is not issuing 
senseless directives. He is efficiently and sensibly formulating the prerequisites 
for integration processes... [that] will proceed of their own accord in line with 
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economic laws that are just as immutable as the law of gravity or the law of the 
conservation of energy." 
 
However, this is remarkably reminiscent of Lenin's hopes for the dual kind of 
"merging" [sblizheniye and sliyaniye] of the various Soviet peoples, and it is 
unsettling to think that, so soon after one such 70-year-long experiment has 
failed totally, another one could begin. 
 
FSB takes the reins 
One not-so-successfully merged region is now being pulled a little closer to the 
center: In Chechnya, federal troops will be replaced by Federal Security Service 
(FSB) officers who will have until 15 May 2001, "to produce results... under the 
new chain of command"; the judicial system will be restored; and the new prime 
minister, Stanislav Ilyasov, will "set up in the first place a competent government, 
a team of people holding the same views, which will react promptly and take 
decisions." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 22 Jan 01; via Johnson's Russia List, 
and ITAR-TASS, 2126 GMT, 11 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0111, via World News 
Connection) Or did he, perhaps, mean "react promptly and take orders?" 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Trust in Putin, but keep your party big 
Back in Moscow, in response to the upcoming "consolidation" of the Duma 
parties, political leaders are streamlining, combining, reshuffling, renaming and 
generally reorganizing (some, while making a point of affirming their allegiance to 
Putin and support for his policies). 
 
State Duma speaker Gennady Seleznev, for example, headed the first congress 
of the Rossiya movement and expressed his accord with the measures 
mentioned in Putin's address to the Federal Assembly -- protecting "the right of 
property, but not the rights of frauds and swindlers," cleansing "the banking 
sphere of those organizations that lack vital capacity," making "the work of 
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financial establishments transparent," fighting "arbitrariness of bureaucrats" and 
so forth. He claimed to be speaking also on behalf of the Russian People's 
Patriotic Union, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (with whose 
leaders he has had differences of opinion) and other left-wing organizations and 
trade unions in promising to cooperate closely. (INTERFAX, 1130 GMT, 13 Jan 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0113, via World News Connection) 
 
Gennady Raykov, the current head of the group of independent State Duma 
deputies that plans to set up a political movement of the People's Deputy, for 
which he is the natural choice as leader, has stated that the "members of the 
group view themselves as a counterbalance to radical trends and as a force able 
to direct the legislative work in a course corresponding to the interests of the 
voters and the entire society." More specifically he stressed that his group views 
[Putin's] Unity as a strategic partner in the State Duma. (RIA, 1144 GMT, 15 Jan 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0115, via World News Connection) 
 
The leaders of the Union of Right-Wing Forces [SPS] are also making somewhat 
hurried plans to form the Union into a party (most likely at the upcoming 26 May 
Congress). The nine organizations that make up the SPS will disband and 
embark on a joint mission. Unlike the other two parties' representatives, however, 
SPS leaders made a point of stating that "It is absolutely unacceptable as far as 
we are concerned to declare loyalty to president and government irrespective of 
what they are actually doing. Our party cannot obediently exercise the will of the 
executive authorities out of servility." (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 24 Jan 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0124, via the World News Connection)  
 
JUDICIARY 
To reform or not to reform? 
The Russian State Duma held its first session of the year on 17 January and 
approved a program for the spring session: 613 legislative acts are to be 
considered between January and June 2001, with priority reserved for the draft 
 4 
laws on political parties, the Constitutional Assembly, a Land Code and a Labor 
Code. (ITAR-TASS, 1401 GMT 17 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0117, via World 
News Connection) 
 
One of the bills it reviewed and approved unanimously at that session was a 
federal law amending the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Practices, and the 
Code of Penitentiaries, with a reform meant to cut the number of prisoners and 
individuals under arrest by 350,000 inmates, to provide for a shorter term of 
punishment for minor crimes, as well as milder punishments and better prison 
conditions. 
 
However, a couple of days later the draft was withdrawn. Dmitry Kozak, deputy 
chief of the presidential staff, explained that this was done for purely technical 
reasons related to a change in statistics submitted by the Supreme Court; 
however, Viktor Pokhmelkin, a parliamentary leader of the Union of Right Forces, 
mentioned that, according to the information available to the SPS, the president 
was influenced by the top people in the General Prosecutor's Office, the FSB, 
and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. "We know that General Prosecutor 
Vladimir Ustinov, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, and Internal Affairs Minister 
Vladimir Rushailo persuaded the president not to change the existing procedure 
governing the detention and arrest of people suspected of having committed 
crimes," the deputy said. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 23 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0124, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Media 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
Gusinsky arrested again 
If a soap opera screenplay writer were looking for material, it would help to pay 
particular attention to the dramatic and surreal developments of the Gusinsky 
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Gazprom/Media-MOST criminal investigation and lawsuit. In the past month and 
a half alone, enough has transpired to inspire at least a season's worth of 
episodes for any network interested in boosting its ratings. 
 
On 12 December, Gusinsky was arrested at his villa in Spain after the Kremlin re-
opened fraud allegations against him. The media oligarch was arrested first in 
June of last year on different charges, accused of bribing Russkoye Video 
Company's general director, Dmitry Roshdestvensky, to allow his MOST to 
acquire 70% of the television company's shares for only $5,000. Shortly 
thereafter, the charges mysteriously were dropped following a secret agreement 
in which Gusinsky would sell his media empire to the state-dominated gas 
monopoly Gazprom, in return for Gazprom securing his debts. Gusinsky backed 
off his agreement with Gazprom and fled to Spain. Prosecutors have now 
launched a new criminal case against him, charging fraud. Moscow has been 
pressing Spain aggressively in efforts to extradite him. The Spanish government 
handed over Moscow's request for extradition to a court on 19 January. The fact 
that the Gusinsky-controlled NTV was highly critical of President Putin's actions 
probably accounts for the harshness of Moscow's pursuit. 
 
Full court press 
Anton Titov, the chief financial officer of Media-MOST, was detained in 
connection with Gusinsky's case (which prevented him from meeting with 
possible Western investors in London). Media-MOST group's first deputy chief, 
Andrei Tsimailo, fled to London and is seeking medical attention after being 
questioned in connection with Media-MOST fraud allegations. On 25 January, 
the first deputy chairman of the Media-MOST board, Igor Malashenko, was 
summoned by the prosecutor general. The same day, NTV anchorwoman 
Tatyana Mitkova also was called in for questioning. Already, there have been 
several raids on the Media-MOST headquarters and company offices. Law 
enforcement sources told INTERFAX that there would be more searches and 
arrests in the Gusinsky case involving Media-MOST. 
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The re-opening of the Gusinsky case in Russia is an appropriate accompaniment 
to a long series of events that continually have clouded the concept of press 
freedoms in Russia. On 16 December, Oleg Luriye, a reporter for the 
independent newspaper Novaya gazeta, had his faced slashed by four men with 
straight razors in front of his home. The attackers did not rob him, and there was 
no other apparent reason for the attack other than to serve as a warning for 
articles Luriye had written about corruption among government officials, 
especially in the Kremlin. (WASHINGTON POST, 28 Dec 00; via 
www.cdi.org/russia) Luriye said that the officers who came to investigate the 
crime left the hat of one of his attackers lying in the snow and performed none of 
the routine investigative procedures such as dusting the garage door handle for 
fingerprints. Luriye is only one among many reporters who has been attacked 
and/or killed for no apparent reason other than that he had worked on journalistic 
cases that in some way or another "embarrassed" the government. According to 
the Glasnost Foundation, last year 35 cases of overt censorship were recorded, 
as were 73 attacks on journalists, while 26 criminal cases were instituted against 
journalists. 
 
There is no indication that the situation will improve in the year 2001. 
  
Putin officially backs foreign investor for NTV 
Despite reports last week that on 25 January a court seized the 19-percent share 
in NTV that had been owned by Media-MOST, and that Gazprom-Media gained a 
controlling stake in the NTV television company, President Vladimir Putin has 
said that "he welcomes CNN founder Ted Turner's proposal to invest in Russian 
media and that he would like NTV to remain as a non-government channel free 
to criticize the Kremlin." (MOSCOW TIMES, 29 Jan 2001; via 
www.themoscowtimes.com) Only a few days ago, Gazprom-Media chief Alfred 
Kokh announced that he would reshuffle the company's board of directors but 
that President Putin, as the "guarantor of the constitution and the securer of the 
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unconditional observation of freedom of speech," "did not want the journalists or 
the management touched." Only a few days ago, Alexei Volin, an aide to the 
prime minister, said, "The state has no right to create special conditions for any 
separate market player...An agreement with Turner's proposals would be an 
example of state protectionism and a violation of the principles of free 
competition." (MOSCOW TIMES, 22 Jan 2001; via www.themoscowtimes.com) 
So why this change in position in the past few days? Simply, it is a change in 
Putin's public relations strategy which has always included smoke and mirrors... 
now the Kremlin has merely placed these illusory devices in different positions. 
Notice that Putin still has not agreed to Ted Turner's request for confirmation that 
the Kremlin will leave NTV alone once it is debt free. Neither has the transaction 
taken place yet whereby Turner (along with George Soros and other Western 
investors) would gain a 25-percent stake in NTV, allowing Gazprom-Media to 
lose its recently acquired controlling stake and therefore protecting NTV's 
independence. 
 
All evidence points to the probability that the government, in the end, will spoil 
the renewed optimism that is sparked by Putin's "shared conviction with Turner 
that media must be honest and balanced in helping to create a civil society." The 
secret is in the omissions from Putin's statements and their clash with his actions. 
One hopes that this skepticism may prove incorrect. Time will show. 
 
Ironic official holidays in Russia 
The "good news" is that there is a "Day of the Press" in Russia, which was 
celebrated on 7 January by President Vladimir Putin addressing 32 top media 
editors and reporters and assuring them that "reports that freedom of the press in 
Russia is dead have been quite exaggerated." According to The Guardian 
newspaper, Putin went on to say, "Many of you in different ways interpret what is 
happening in the country, and our foreign policy initiatives and steps... You do 
this sometimes, even quite often, in a very sharp and critical way... The state 
swallows this and, even more, I must tell you that this is useful for government at 
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any level as it makes us react to the mistakes the state sometimes makes." 
(REUTERS, 13 Jan 01; via www.cdi.org/russia). But, he added, "Its 
unshakeability [sic] depends not only on correct laws but on the demands the 
journalist places on himself, on his responsibility to his country and to society.... 
With each article and word, you have again and again to show your right to the 
trust of the people. Indeed, authority and trust are not given at once and forever." 
The bad news is that Putin concluded by noting that while some journalists died 
in the course of their work, they are, after all, in one of the most dangerous 
professions. 
 
In this same month, Moscow commemorated another official holiday: 
"Prosecutor's Day." Putin spoke on this occasion, addressing almost 4,000 
prosecutors. He called their "vast functions and strong supervisory powers," 
which have remained unchanged since the Soviet era, a "compensation" for the 
lack of law and order in Russia. (WASHINGTON POST, 20 Jan 01; via 
www.cdi.org/russia) 
 
While the functions of the office have remained unchanged, the powers have 
decreased lately. According to Boris Uvarov, a veteran top investigator forced 
into retirement last year, "there was more political interference in investigations 
today than there had been during the Soviet period." (Jamestown Foundation 
FORTNIGHT IN REVIEW, 19 Jan 01) A most recent example of political 
interference in the prosecutor's investigations came when the prosecutor general 
office chose to close the Mabetex case, which implicated Pavel Borodin (Putin's 
former boss and current Russia-Belarus union state secretary at the president's 
recommendation) for allegedly accepting a large sum in kickbacks as a 
government official from the Swiss engineering construction firm in exchange for 
lucrative contracts to refurbish Russian government buildings. Borodin was 
arrested on 20 January in the United States and is facing extradition to 
Switzerland where he can be tried by the Swiss courts. The contradiction 
between the government's protection of Borodin when accused of accepting 
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kickbacks and the government's relentless pursuit of Gusinsky and all aspects of 
his media empire when he was accused initially of giving kickbacks, testifies to 
the government's level of commitment to universal application of the rule, or 
"dictatorship of law." 
 
Which official holiday and corresponding speech is more alarming? Should one 
look to the holiday that pays only lip service to the existence of a free press in 
Russia, yet has been preceded by countless violations of press freedom? Or 
should one view the cynical statement to the effect that journalism comes with 
inherent dangers? Or should one note the irony of the fact that all of this 
coincided with the month in which Gazprom-Media sued for a controlling stake in 
the only independent television station in Russia, and when it is still entirely 
unclear whether foreign investors will be allowed to prevent this eventuality? Or 
should one focus on the startling fact that while the president has stated 
repeatedly that he will restore the "dictatorship of the law," it seems that what he 
might really mean is that he will use the law and the prosecutor's office to 
politicize the law when he deems it in the country's "security interests," and will 
disregard the law when it jeopardizes one of his old friends and a member of the 
political elite? 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Kaliningrad or Koenigsberg? 
Will German economic interests in Kaliningrad result in the enclave assuming its 
ancient Prussian character or is Russia simply seeking improved economic 
relations with Germany across the board? The usually overlooked Russian 
oblast' Kaliningrad appeared in the headlines this month, becoming the subject of 
foreign press rumors about its economic fate. (ITAR-TASS, 2157 GMT, 22 Jan 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0122, via World News Connection) Situated between 
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Poland and Lithuania, the enclave is in dire straits economically, despite 
providing a conduit for much of Russia's European imports, including narcotics. 
An intriguing report emerged in the 21 January London Sunday Times, alleging a 
"secret" Russian-German agreement that would give German entrepreneurs 
what the paper termed "economic privileges" in exchange for writing off some of 
Russia's debts. (LONDON TIMES, 21 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) 
 
While Russia certainly could benefit from a German cancellation of its $20 billion 
debt, both the German and Russian governments are denying the existence of 
such an agreement. (INTERFAX, 1545 GMT, 6 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-0106, via 
World News Connection) The German embassy in Moscow stated that the report 
had been "plucked completely out of thin air." (ITAR-TASS, 2157 GMT, 22 Jan 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0122, via World News Connection), while Vladimir Yegorov, 
governor of Kaliningrad, denied that he had received orders from Moscow to 
grant most favored nation status to German entrepreneurs. (ITAR-TASS, 2022 
GMT, 22 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0122, via World News Connection) 
 
However, it is true that Russian-German relations are improving at both the 
personal and governmental levels. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's 
"personal" Moscow visit to share Orthodox Christmas with German-speaking 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his family not only included festivities, but 
also continued the Russian-German dialogue over debt issues and cooperation. 
In this manner, Russia's diplomacy vis-à-vis Germany is following a fairly 
pragmatic course towards improving relations. Even if the rumor concerning 
Kaliningrad does not reflect reality, it does highlight Russia's ongoing economic 
morass and its general attempts to harness diplomatic relations to economic 
rewards, whether this means selling military hardware to its former rival, as in the 
Chinese case, or breaking agreements with the United States over Iran in order 
to reap the benefits of the Iranian market. That Russia is pursuing this strategy 
with Germany is only logical since the strong German economy holds out 
potential benefits for Russia. 
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Kono: No more Mr. Nice 
As barbs replace the positive rhetoric, tensions in Russo-Japanese relations 
increase over prospective summit dates, debt repayment and the territorial issue. 
Unfortunately, high-level meetings in Moscow have only worsened the situation. 
 
Over the past month, Japan's usually cordial tone has turned to impatience as 
the Russian government continues to delay the presidential summit to be held in 
Irkutsk. While meant to ease tensions, the Moscow foreign ministers meeting 
held early in January appears to have increased them. After the Moscow 
meeting, Japan announced that the summit date had been set for 25-26 
February. (SANKEI SHIMBUM, 18 Jan 01; FBIS-EAS-2001-0118, via World 
News Connection) Only days later, the Russian government denied that any 
such date had been set, citing Putin's already-booked schedule. (INTERFAX, 
1725 GMT, 19 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0119 via World News Connection) That 
schedule, however, includes an Asian tour that will exclude Japan, to Tokyo's 
irritation. 
 
As news of the perceived snub reached Tokyo, the Japanese government 
replaced its cordial veneer with acerbity. Demanding that the Kremlin keep its 
word and agree to a new date for the Russo-Japanese summit (late February), 
Foreign Minister Yohei Kono berated his Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov in a 20-
minute phone call on 19 January. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1126 GMT, 19 
Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) The next day, Russia proposed a yet later date (25-26 
March). Over the last six months, Russia has set three dates, but has backed out 
each time. 
 
From the Japanese perspective the territorial question is of great concern, but 
Russia's actions belie its ostensible commitment to resolving the issue. The 
Japanese are right to note that the Russians are dragging their feet on the 
matter, but as long as trade with the Japanese rises -- up 20% in 2000 -- there is 
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no incentive for the Russians to relinquish their control of the four Kurile islands. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1128 GMT, 17 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0117, via World News 
Connection) In a recent statement, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander 
Losyukov all but admitted that the Russians are purposely delaying an 
agreement, saying that, "The conclusion of the peace treaty is being hampered 
by the border issue," but "the islands are our national territory." (INTERFAX, 
0301 GMT, 13 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001 0113, via World News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, there is at least one voice in Tokyo that seems to understand the 
futility of Japan's current negotiating strategy: Ryutaro Hashimoto, Japan's 
former prime minister (who cut the 1997 deal with former Russian President 
Boris Yel'tsin to resolve the territorial issue once and for all). "[The Russians] 
were always like this in the past, I don't think they've changed," Hashimoto said 
in a recent interview. (SANKEI SHIMBUM, 18 Jan 01; FBIS-EAS-2001-0118, via 
World News Connection) While Japan might settle for the 1997 interim 
agreement for two of the four islands to be returned by Russia, its only real 
leverage is to ratchet up the economic pressure on Russia, by demanding debt 
repayment and hampering trade with Russia's eastern regions. Otherwise, there 
is little incentive for Russia to take Japan any more seriously than it has since 
1997. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Russia -- North, South, East and West 
The past three months have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of Russian 
military activities and international initiatives in all directions of the compass. This 
resurgent activism constitutes a considerable change from a military organization 
that only this past summer was mired in internal dissent over restructuring, arms 
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industry reforms and difficulties concerning Chechnya operations, and was 
reeling from the 12 August Kursk submarine disaster. 
 
Coupled with Putin's outreach initiatives on other fronts with former Soviet 
republics, this militarily forged, leading edge of the current Russian foreign policy 
sword looks strikingly similar to the doctrine and activities pursed by the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s. The following is but a brief summary of a few recent 
significant developments: 
 
NORTH 
--Despite the absence of contiguous neighbors or immediate threats to the north, 
Russia continues with temporary forward basing of long-range bombers in the far 
north for Arctic training missions. Started early in December, these flights appear 
to be developing into a regular pattern, both in intent as stated by the Russian Air 
Force and in practice. Such arctic flights to probe Western air defenses were 
common in the Soviet period, but why in the current world does this training need 
to become "regular"? Russia's answer probably lies in its perception of the 
biggest threat to strategic stability -- US fielding of a limited National Missile 
Defense (NMD) system. Caught between aging nuclear forces they cannot afford 
to maintain over the long-term and a potential US missile shield (the first 
proposed component being a radar site in Alaska), the arctic flights may 
constitute a "virtual" military option that the Kremlin feels it can exercise. (See 
The NIS Observed, 13 Dec 00, for further discussion.) 
 
SOUTH 
--Following President Putin's visit to Azerbaijan, efforts were undertaken to draft 
military technical cooperation documents between the two countries. The two 
governments already have concluded an agreement to train Azeri military 
personnel in Russian military academies and schools. (ITAR-TASS, 1822 GMT, 
12 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0112, via World News Connection) 
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--Agreement has been reached on partial payment for the leasing of military 
testing grounds in Kazakhstan through weapons exports and training programs 
for Kazakh forces. (ITAR-TASS, 1035 GMT, 12 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0112, 
via World News Connection) 
--The largest single arms contract between India and Russia has been concluded 
for licensed production of tactical aircraft and associated jet engines. 
--Broad-ranging cooperation on a variety of military issues has been extended to 
Iran, including potentially large and diverse arms sales. (See The NIS Observed, 
17 Jan 01, for further discussion.) 
 
EAST 
--Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev met with the Japanese Vice Defense 
Minister, Ken Sato, to develop bilateral cooperation programs in 2001. One initial 
result is a planned joint naval rescue exercise. Follow-on visits by the various 
Russian military service chiefs to Tokyo may lead to further collaboration this 
year. (ITAR-TASS, 1800 GMT, 16 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0116, via World 
News Connection) 
--Although publicly denying any attempt to sign a defense treaty with China, 
nonetheless, senior defense officials from the two countries met toward the end 
of 2000 and several major arms deals were concluded which will result in the 
transfer of ships, airplanes, and other weapon systems to China. (INTERFAX, 
1409 GMT, 15 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0115, via World News Connection) 
 
WEST 
--Sergeev recently also held talks with French Defense Minister Alain Richard on 
extending bilateral military cooperation. Sergeev hinted that Franco-Russian 
military relations probably would move faster than Russian-NATO engagement. 
(INTERFAX, 1547 GMT, 17 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0117, via World News 
Connection) This may include joint work on a MiG training aircraft. (INTERFAX, 
1007 GMT, 17 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0117, via World News Connection) 
France's firm Thomson would provide the modern electronic equipment for the 
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cockpits and these aircraft probably would be tailored for the export markets to 
third-party countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1119 GMT, 17 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0117, 
via World News Connection) Additionally, the two countries agreed to pursue 
further several space and satellite programs. 
--Details are yet unknown, but more Sergeev talks are to take place with German 
and Macedonian counterparts: Expected to be high on the agenda for these 
discussions are the current situation in the Balkans, future bilateral cooperation 
and potential Russian arms sales. (ITAR-TASS, 0642 GMT, 23 Jan 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0123, via World News Connection) 
--Agreement has been reached on joint exercises with Moldova and cooperation 
with the two general staffs and scientific institutions. (ITAR-TASS, 1454 GMT, 16 
Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0116, via World News Connection) 
--A 52-point military cooperation plan has been signed, further integrating all 
aspects of the military relationship, with Ukraine. (ITAR-TASS, 1642 GMT, 18 
Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0118, via World News Connection) Also discussed were 
three planned exercises in 2001 and the possibility of increasing the Russian 
Naval presence in the Black Sea by amending the previously agreed upon force 
levels in the Crimea. (INTERFAX, 1409 GMT, 20 Jan 01, and ITAR-TASS, 1426 
GMT, 20 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0120, via World News Connection) 
--Completion is planned this spring of a joint Russian-Belarus Military Doctrine, 
with the goal of agreeing to protect the territorial integrity of the two countries 
"within the framework of a single military organization." (ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA, 23 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0123, via World News Connection) 
 
One may ask what has been the point of this surge in military "activism" around 
the compass. In addition to the obvious furtherance of military-to-military 
relations, several common themes are emerging from these new Russian visits 
and initiatives around the world: 
 
Opposition to ABM Treaty modifications intended to accommodate a US National 
Missile Defense (NMD) system. In virtually every discussion with foreign 
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representatives, both in Europe and Asia, Russian military officials repeatedly 
stressed their opposition to US NMD plans. They also manipulated the 
discussions in an attempt to sway the various countries to bring similar pressure 
against the United States. From the Russian perspective, the more weight and 
consensus they can put behind NMD opposition the better. 
 
Heavy emphasis on Russian arms sales abroad to bolster the domestic arms 
industry. While 2000 saw the strongest Russian overseas arms sales 
performance in almost a decade, further growth in the export market is required 
to help pay for government debt to defense companies and generate cash to 
help finance the planned 43% increase in defense research and development 
expenditures in 2001. (ITAR-TASS, 1825 GMT, 15 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0115, via World News Connection) While some of the increase will be offset by a 
small decrease in Russian domestic purchases of weapons, the defense budget 
alone will be hard-pressed to support the research and development increase 
without profits from overseas sales. The long-range vision for this reshaping of 
the procurement program is to spend the next six to eight years focused on R&D, 
with procurement of new types of modern weapon systems in the 2008-2015 
time frame. (INTERFAX, 1303 GMT, 16 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0116, via World 
News Connection) In addition to stepping up arms transfers to historic partners, 
Moscow has made initial probes to potential new markets and is anxiously 
awaiting the day when sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and Iraq are lifted 
so it can resume official transfer to these countries as well. 
 
Opposition to NATO eastward expansion -- re-exert influence/domination of 
portions of the 'Near Abroad.' Sergeev bluntly stated Russia's position on this 
topic in the negotiations with Ukrainian officials: "Russia's position on NATO 
expansion east is well-known and has not undergone any changes: Russia 
categorically objects to NATO expansion east, taking into account that there are 
no other military alliances in Europe The danger emanates from the south, while 
NATO is moving eastwards -- this is what confuses and worries Russia." 
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(INTERFAX, 1640 GMT, 18 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0118, via World News 
Connection) Indeed, the manner and method of the actual and proposed 
negotiations with Ukraine and Belarus appear as thinly veiled attempts by 
Moscow to exert greater control over these countries than afforded normally by 
purely military cooperation agreements. 
 
Military visits are the leading edge of foreign policy. Defense Minister Sergeev 
and other senior Russian officials have been actively traveling and receiving 
delegations in a variety of military visits. These visits and meetings appear to be 
the cementing foundation to follow-on negotiations and cooperation. In fact, in 
both the French and Iranian talks, it was indicated that they constituted a prelude 
to upcoming summit visits later this year. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The ties that bind 
The events of the past two weeks have made one fact abundantly clear: It may 
be a decade since the demise of the Soviet Union, but Moscow's elites still 
understand how to keep control of what they consider their "zone of influence." 
As the Ukrainian government has sunk into turmoil, Russia's leaders, from both 
the public and private sectors, have increased the pressure for concessions from 
their "little Russian" neighbor. From military to economic interests, to language 
and media, to religion, varied Russian interests have made their voices heard 
loudly and clearly. In at least two spheres -- the military and religion -- this 
pressure has the clear potential to impede significantly Ukraine's long-term ability 
to maintain a stable, cohesive state. 
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Since its independence, Ukraine steadfastly has refused all requests for "joint 
military control" of the Black Sea area. In fact, the country's insistence on 
separate, independent bases in Sevastopol was one of the major points of 
contention between Russia and Ukraine during negotiations of the Black Sea 
Fleet agreements. Ukraine also steadfastly has refused to provide Russia with 
any advance notice of foreign troop exercises in the Black Sea, providing an 
important buffer between NATO and Russia. These two achievements, however, 
now appear to be in doubt. 
 
On 20 January, Russia and Ukraine ended a meeting between their defense 
ministers by announcing "a plan for military cooperation" in 2001. Although that 
"plan" actually seemed to amount to a series of "understandings," it nevertheless 
signaled a softening of Ukraine's position. According to Ukrainian Defense 
Minister Oleksandr Kuzmuk, the two sides established a "cooperation list" 
containing 52 items, including the creation of a joint observation post in 
Sevastopol. In addition, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev noted that 
Ukraine had agreed to take part in an upcoming Sea Breeze naval exercise -- 
something the country had always refused to do -- and that Russia "from the 
start" would be involved "in planning all multinational exercises taking place on 
Ukraine's territory." (INTERFAX, 1409 GMT, 20 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0120, 
and ITAR-TASS, 1642 GMT, 18 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0118, via World News 
Connection) This last item no doubt was greeted with concern in NATO 
headquarters, as planning for upcoming Partnership for Peace exercises 
continues. How great the concern should be will depend on the level of 
implementation of these agreements. But clearly, following difficult dealings with 
the European Union, Council of Europe, and international lending organizations, 
Ukraine has felt it necessary to return to closer military ties with its longtime -- 
albeit not chosen -- partner. 
 
Meanwhile, as Defense Minister Sergeev was dealing with the military issue, 
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksey II was doing his best to convince Pope John 
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Paul II to reverse his decision to visit Ukraine. By doing so, he no doubt hoped to 
blunt the growing Catholic presence in the country. The patriarch has often 
stated his objection to attempts by Ukrainian (Greek and Roman) Catholics to 
establish parishes in previously state-mandated all-Orthodox areas. "If they 
consider Orthodoxy to be just as beneficial and capable of salvation as 
Catholicism," he recently asked, "then what is the sense of this constant effort to 
draw people into their faith?" (REUTERS, 15 Jan 01; via America Online) The 
Vatican, which is attempting to minister to a religion that was outlawed during 
Soviet times, appears to have ignored his statements. In fact, while in Ukraine, 
the pope may meet with representatives from the two Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
branches that split from Moscow's control following Ukraine's independence. 
 
That suggestion has been met with anger by the leader of the Kyiv branch of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Volodymyr. He explained his feelings in 
a letter to the pope. "If, during your visit," he wrote, "a meeting takes place 
between Your Holiness and any of the dissident leaders [refusing to swear 
allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate]... it would mean that the Roman Catholic 
Church ignores the principles for canonical relations between churches and 
grossly interferes in our internal affairs, using its influence to support the 
dissenters. This may lead to unfavorable consequences in relations between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox." (INTERFAX, 22 Jan 01; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
Moscow Patriarch Aleksey put it more bluntly. "If during your visit there is a 
meeting between Your Holiness and any one of the schismatic leaders... it would 
mean the practical end of relations between our churches," he said in a 
statement. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 23 Jan 01) 
 
Unfortunately, the continuing assault on the newly reborn Catholic and 
independent Ukrainian Orthodox faiths makes for no less potential damage to 
long-term Ukrainian state viability than the possibility that the country's military 
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will undertake joint operations with Russia. Ukraine's ability to build a separate 
religious identity is key to it building a separate national identity, which is, in turn, 
key to it building a stable independent state. Perhaps knowing this, the pope has 
refused to yield to the patriarch's statements, instead suggesting, "I have great 
hopes for my trips to Syria and Ukraine. It's my desire that they will contribute to 
reconciliation and peace among Christians." Moreover, "We shouldn't minimize 
the differences between us," he noted. "The struggle is not to ignore them, but to 
overcome them." (AP WORLDSTREAM, 25 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) The leader of 
the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine was not so conciliatory, however. 
"Suggesting that a man of the Holy Father's age and health should 'postpone' 
such a trip is sheer cynicism and unworthy of Christian writing," said Father 
Serge Keleher. 
 
And Russian Orthodox leaders in Moscow have continued to attack. "The letter 
[to the pope] was just aimed at making clear our position," a spokesperson for 
Patriarch Aleksey suggested. "But we don't guarantee that people won't protest 
and that there won't be demonstrations and banner-waving." (REUTERS, 23 Jan 
01; via America Online) 
 
Clearly, the pope's visit, scheduled for 23-25 June, is set to release a storm of 
religious feeling in Ukraine. On one hand, Ukraine's Catholics -- and even 
independent Orthodox Christians -- look forward to the legitimacy a visit by the 
pope will give their beliefs, and their new state. On the other, the Moscow 
patriarchate continues to cling desperately to dreams of one reunited Russian 
Orthodox community. Unfortunately, as nationalist fervor rises in Western 
Ukraine, the government grows closer to Russia and discontent over the work of 
the government spreads through Central Ukraine, the pope has landed squarely 
in the center of a deep debate about the future of the country. It appears the only 
thing certain about Pope John Paul II's upcoming visit to Ukraine is that he will 
enter a country in turmoil and transition. Perhaps his visit will truly add to a 
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feeling of reconciliation in the country. While that seems unlikely, who knows? 
Miracles have been known to happen. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
Erratum: President Aslan Maskhadov was elected for a five-year term in January 
1997, which expires on 27 January 2002. In the previous issue of The NIS 
Observed, this was reported erroneously as an extension of his term. 
 
KGB: greater than the sum of its parts? 
On 22 January, Putin transferred command for operations in Chechnya from the 
armed forces to the FSB. The same decree created a new body, the Operational 
Headquarters for the Command and Control of Counterterrorist Operations on 
the Territory of the Russian Federation's North Caucasus Region. This new 
bureaucracy brings together not just the agencies that succeeded the KGB (such 
as FAPSI, FSB, Border Guards) but also the MVD and the justice ministry that 
were separate entities for most of Soviet history. This move follows months of 
rumors and speculation about a possible reconstitution of the successor "power 
ministries" into a single "superpower" ministry. For the time being this ominous 
trend is confined geographically to the North Caucasus region, but there is no 
telling where the tendency toward such a merger will end.  
 
The old/new structure brings together the following under the direction of the 
FSB: 
The Russian Federation president's plenipotentiary representative in the 
Southern Federal District; the Russian Federation minister of internal affairs; the 
Russian Federation minister for affairs of civil defense, emergency situations and 
elimination of natural disasters; the Russian Federation minister of justice; the 
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general director of the Russian Federation president's Federal Government 
Communications and Information Agency; the director of the Russian Federation 
Federal Border Guard Service; the chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 
General Staff/Russian Federation first deputy minister of defense; the first deputy 
director of the Russian Federation Federal Security Service; the director of the 
Russian Federation Federal Railway Troops Service/commander of the Russian 
Federation Railway Troops; and the chief of the Russian Federation Armed 
Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate/deputy chief of the Russian 
Federation Armed Forces General Staff. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 23 Jan 01, 
BBC Monitoring, via Turkistan Newsletter) 
 
Maskhadov: 'All wars end in negotiations' 
The general rule holds for the particular, as Maskhadov commented in a recent 
interview, "This war will also end in negotiations with Maskhadov." He reiterated 
the consistent Chechen position that talks can begin immediately without 
preconditions. "The Chechen side is ready to a maximal compromise with the 
Russian side. I also assert that the only indisputable issue is the safety 
guarantee to my people," he said. Maskhadov has appointed a special 
representative, Education Minister Kurzhakhmet Irekhanov, to conduct talks with 
Russian officials. (www.grani.ru, 29 Jan 01) In distributing the text of the 
interview, an independent Chechen website (www.ichkeria.org ) commented that 
all Russian television stations have failed to broadcast the video of the interview 
due to "censorship in the Russian media." 
 
Tougher line at State gets Ivanov's attention 
In his 24 January briefing, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher spoke 
far more bluntly about the war in Chechnya than under the previous 
administration. He characterized the present situation as a "stalemate," called for 
negotiations and a political settlement, and exhibited skepticism as to whether 
recent announcements represent a real changes in policy. 
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"[W]e have seen announcements of troop withdrawals from Chechnya before. 
But, frankly, Russia's presence in Chechnya remains massive. Fighting has 
continued and there are continuing and credible reports of humanitarian abuses 
against the civilian population by Russian troops. Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether this announcement represents a change in Russian strategy that could 
resolve the stalemate in Chechnya," he said. (www.state.gov) 
 
The Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, reacted swiftly, expressing hopes for 
direct talks with the new US administration to clarify Russia's position on 
Chechnya. (LONDON TIMES, 26 Jan 01) Should it materialize, a dialogue of that 
nature would give the Bush administration an opportunity to press for a political 
resolution to the conflict. 
 
Does PACE believe in the tooth fairy? 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) restored Russia's 
voting privileges last week. When those voting rights were suspended in April 
2000, the group called on Russia to make "substantial, accelerating and 
demonstrable progress" towards eradicating human rights abuses and called for 
a cease-fire in Chechnya. The assembly also directed member nations to bring 
war crimes charges against Russia in the European Court for Human Rights. 
(REUTERS, 6 Apr 00; via lexis-nexis) It's quite clear that Russian policy falls 
substantially below that standard. Instead of holding Russia to the requirements 
the assembly itself had set, the parliamentarians seemed satisfied with far less. 
 
In the weeks preceding the PACE vote, Putin had laid out a misleading and 
manipulative program on Chechnya that gave the appearance of a less bellicose 
policy that is, in fact, little different from the murder and plunder that preceded it. 
Putin created the appearance of setting up a civilian Chechen-run administration 
by upgrading Akhmed Kadyrov's title to acting president, appointing Stanislav 
Alyasov as prime minister, and announcing new funding for a reconstruction 
program to be administered by these authorities. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
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25 Jan 01; via lexis-nexis) Kadyrov remains an appointee of Putin within a 
Russian bureaucracy in which he is subordinate to Russian General Viktor 
Kazantsev. Neither can Kadyrov be regarded as representative of Chechnya nor 
his government as a form of local administration -- a colonial administration 
employing ethnic cadres should not be confused with regional autonomy. The 
reconstruction program leaves little room for expecting improvement since such 
projects have been elaborated repeatedly in the past but, partly due to 
disorganization and corruption, have never been implemented. 
 
As for the military withdrawal, it became apparent immediately that the army is no 
hurry to leave. (www.polit.ru, 31 Jan 01) If it did leave there is no reason to 
suppose that the FSB would behave better in its absence. In fact, with journalists 
and human rights workers barred from the republic, and the military withdrawn, 
the FSB could act with even greater impunity. The repeated instances of 
cooperation between the FSB and known hostage takers suggest that the FSB 
may simply co-rule and divide the spoils with the ugliest elements of Chechen 
society. Another possibility is a repeat of the worst abuses of Stalin's reign. Pavel 
Felgenhauer, a very well-informed and highly regarded analyst, has drawn 
parallels between the Putin's "new" approach of garrisoning troops under FSB 
command in Chechen villages and similar arrangements employed by Stalin and 
Beria. He also warned of the possibility that rather than seek a political solution, 
Russian authorities may copy "Stalin's bloody endgame" -- which was genocidal 
and went unpunished. (MOSCOW TIMES, 25 Jan 01) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
Central Asian leaders review regional security 
The Central Asian presidents met in Kazakhstan's commercial hub, Almaty, on 5 
January to discuss regional security and cooperation. Once again, stated 
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concerns over the Taliban have moved to the forefront of relations between the 
Central Asian states and other countries in the region. The Central Asians are 
beset by such security concerns as a repetition of Taliban-inspired incursions into 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as well as the situation along the Tajik-Afghan 
border. 
 
The Central Asian summit, chaired by Tajikistan, included Presidents Nursultan 
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, Imomali Rakhmanov of 
Tajikistan and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, as well as Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov (former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service). 
Turkmenistan, which has established a dialogue with Afghanistan's ruling Taliban 
regime, did not send any representatives. (JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 17 Jan 
01) At the start, Uzbek President Karimov stated, "stability in one state today 
means stability in all other members in the community," and called on the Central 
Asian states to make a concerted effort to defend themselves against regional 
threats, especially Afghanistan-based Islamic insurgencies. (INTERFAX, 1625 
GMT, 5 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0105, via World News Connection) 
 
Indeed, the Central Asian states are anticipating a new summer offensive by the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 2001. "We do not have the right to 
allow the scenario of bandit formations invading Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 
1999-2000 to repeat itself in 2001," Karimov said. (INTERFAX, 1625 GMT, 5 Jan 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0105, via World News Connection) The IMU raided 
Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and staged several incursions into a remote mountainous 
region bordering southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan from bases in Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan in August 2000. (See The NIS Observed, 27 Sep 00.) Another 
round of IMU attacks coupled with other non-traditional security threats such as 
drug trafficking and arms smuggling may further destabilize Central Asia.  
 
Speaking after the summit, President Rakhmanov stressed that, despite harsh 
winter conditions facing the estimated 10,000 Afghans on the Tajik-Afghan 
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border, "not a single refugee from Afghan territory will be allowed into Tajik 
territory." (BBC NEWS, 6 Jan 01) "There are several hundred men armed to the 
teeth," Rakhmanov claimed, indicating that "extremists and terrorists" have 
banded together with Afghan refugees. (INTERFAX, 1339 GMT, 5 Jan 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0105, via World News Connection) Tajikistan, after a five-year civil 
war and sustained incursions from other Central Asian states, lacks the 
resources to deal with the growing refugee crisis. 
 
Tajikistan also opposes Pakistan joining the Shanghai-5, because of Islamabad's 
unyielding political and military support for the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan. The Shanghai-5 was created in 1996 to discuss border security and 
consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. The regional 
forum's security agenda was expanded at the Bishkek summit in 1999 to include 
measures against international terrorism, drug trafficking and arms smuggling. 
(JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 3 Jan 01) In contrast, Kazakhstan's president 
recommended serious consideration of Pakistan's application for membership in 
the forum. (INTERFAX, 1632 GMT, 5 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0105, via World 
News Connection) Currently only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates recognize the Taliban government. The UN Security Council imposed 
new sanctions, including an arms embargo, against the Taliban on 19 December. 
 
Pakistan wants to join the Shanghai-5 because of its geographic proximity to 
Central Asia and its interest in Central Asia's vast energy resources. Pakistan 
also seeks to work more closely with Russia, a strategic partner of rival India. 
Islamabad's conciliatory tone may indicate its readiness to review its Afghanistan 
policy. The "Afghanistan problem" and Pakistan's request for membership in the 
Shanghai-5 are likely to be at the top of the security agenda at the next Central 
Asian summit in Tashkent in April or May 2001. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
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By Kate Martin 
 
LATVIA 
CE gives thumbs up for treatment of minorities... 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave the Latvian 
government fairly high marks for its treatment of ethnic minorities -- despite yet 
another push by Russia for condemnation of the Baltic state's efforts -- and voted 
to end its monitoring of Latvia during its meeting in Strasbourg on 23 January. 
While noting the continued slow pace of naturalization, representatives from 
Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Turkey in general noted Latvia's 
achievements with regard to minorities. The final PACE report praised the lifting 
of naturalization "windows," the passage of a program for the integration of 
minorities, and the adoption of the state language law. The assembly 
encouraged noncitizens to learn the Latvian language and avail themselves of 
every opportunity to acquire citizenship in order to become involved in the 
country's political, economic, social and cultural life. (BNS, 1155 GMT, 23 Jan 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0123, via World News Connection) 
 
At the Strasbourg meeting, President Vaira Vike-Freiberga promised the 
assembly that Latvia would ratify the convention on the protection of national 
minorities, although no concrete date had been set. (BNS, 1319 GMT, 23 Jan 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0123, via World News Connection) 
 
Indeed, only Russia seemed unsatisfied with Latvia's treatments of persons living 
in the country. In an interesting twist, the assembly looked at Latvia for a report of 
how Russia is treating persons living in its country. Latvian Foreign Minister 
Indulis Berzins, who serves as chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of 
Ministers, was tasked with reporting on the introduction of human rights, law and 
democracy in Chechnya as PACE members discussed restoring the Russian 
delegation's voting rights in the assembly. (BNS, 1524 GMT, 22 Jan 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0122, via World News Connection) Berzins told reporters he saw 
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some progress -- marked by the involvement of some Chechens in militia and 
local administration (without delving too deeply into the nature of their 
collaboration) -- although investigations and legal proceedings were noticeably 
slow. 
 
....thumbs down for corruption control efforts 
While Latvia's treatment of minorities earned it praise, recently released research 
by the Council of Europe (CE) indicates that the country has made insufficient 
efforts to combat money laundering. The report pointed to a growing crime rate in 
Latvia, especially in terms of drug-related and economic crimes, and panned 
investigative procedures for being too bureaucratic. (BNS, 1836 GMT, 22 Jan 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0123, via World News Connection) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Conflict over oil supplies heats up 
Lithuanian efforts to control the country's crude oil supply have been less than 
successful for years, in large part due to a refusal by the Russian supplier LUKoil 
to reach agreement, or honor contracts, concerning provisions. Now it appears 
that the inclusion of the US-based Williams Company -- a longtime irritant to 
Russian oil interests that had sought control of Lithuania's oil industry -- may 
provide the spark that ignites the volatile relationship between supplier and 
refinery. 
 
Discussions between Williams International, which operates the oil refinery at 
Mazeikiai, and LUKoil to maintain an even flow have continued for over a year, 
with no agreement in sight. So, at the behest of John Bumgarner, president of 
Williams International, Lithuanian Economics Minister Eugenijus Maldeikis 
recently traveled to Moscow to discuss a long-term oil supply deal between 
LUKoil and Mazeikiai Oil. The minister had no success. ""[LUKoil 
representatives] see no possibilities for the time being," Maldeikis reported upon 
his return to Vilnius. (BNS, 1337 GMT, 16 JAN 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0116, via 
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World News Connection) Moreover, in subsequent discussions between LUKoil-
Baltiya CEO Ivan Paleychik and Arturas Paulaskas, chairman of the Lithuanian 
parliament, Paleychik warned that Russia -- reportedly unhappy about LUKoil's 
inferior role in the negotiations -- may cut down oil supplies to Lithuania. This is in 
line with the tenor of the negotiations ever since Lithuania first discussed selling 
an interest in the oil industry. However, the response from Mazeikiai to this latest 
round of threats was a volley of counterthreats: According to a company 
statement, Mazeikiai Oil not only will stop supplying petroleum products to 
LUKoil-subsidiaries, but also will demand that the subsidiaries be deprived of all 
licenses for supplying petroleum products from any other supplier to Lithuania. 
(INTERFAX, 1717 GMT, 19 Jan 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0121, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Can, and should, Mazeikiai make good on those threats? Perhaps. LUKoil 
representatives have played fast and loose with earlier agreements to supply 
crude oil on a regular basis, causing numerous shutdowns of the refinery and 
affecting Lithuania's economy and comfort levels. And, since the government 
retains a vested interest in the oil concern, further involvement in the negotiations 
would not be ill-considered. However, the government of Rolandas Paksas has 
indicated that the state may review its agreement with Williams, so the American 
company is not assured of Lithuania's unreserved support. (Moreover, Maldeikis' 
Moscow trip helped lead to the minister's forced resignation.) 
 
At the moment, no agreements have been reached with other suppliers, although 
the courtship phase has begun with a region that is coming into its own in terms 
of controlling petroleum supplies: Central Asia. According to Ikram Adyrbekov, 
the ambassador to Vilnius, Kazakhstan plans to increase the flow of cargo 
through the Lithuanian port Klaipeda fourfold this year. Moreover, the 
ambassador said, with a recent increase in petroleum production, Kazakhstan is 
looking for the best deal to export petroleum to the West, and Lithuania is 
considered to be a favorable partner for this endeavor. (BNS, 0715 GMT, 17 Jan 
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01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0-117, via World News Connection) Of course, there 
remains a large hurdle to such plans: getting the oil from Kazakhstan to 
Lithuania. 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2001 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol6/ed0602.html. 
